Инсайты Матвеева / Insights from Matveev

Yesterday, I commented in Arabic with the "After the War" program at the Syrian Television on the prospects for a Syria-Türkiye rapprochement with the diplomatic assistance of Russia. Experts from Syria, Iraq, and Türkiye also took part in the program.

Here are the main points:

- Russia has been making intensive efforts to launch the process of the Syrian-Turkish detente. Among them the facilitation of a four-party meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Iran, Syria, and Türkiye on May 10, 2023, in Moscow. Whereas the road map for a rapprochement was discussed.

- Moscow considers an Ankara-Damascus rapprochement important right now, amidst the multiple conflicts across the MENA region (war in Gaza, clashes in the Red Sea, confrontation between Iran and Israel, etc.). Facing such circumstances, Russia is not interested in further escalations in the region.

- All above mentioned explains why it is not so important for Russia, where a meeting between Presidents al-Assad and Erdogan takes place. The options include Türkiye (which is the most favorable scenario for the Turkish authorities), Iraq, or a GCC state.

- At the same time, Russia understands that a Syrian-Turkish reconciliation cannot be achieved at any cost, i.e without taking into account the legitimate interests of Damascus. Those imply the full restoration of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, as well as the joint struggle of Russia and Syria against terrorism.

This in turn raises the question of restoring a complete control of the Syrian authorities over the part of the Idlib province, now, remaining under the terrorists' control.

One should also not forget that unlike the military personnel of Russia and Iran, the Turkish army (as well as the Americans) occupies certain parts of Syria without the permission of the Syrian government.

- Despite all difficulties, the Russian side considers a normalization of relations between Ankara and Damascus quite possible, focusing on diplomatic methods in achieving this goal. Which could reduce tensions in the areas located along the Syrian-Turkish border.

- The Russian side has been using the established formats of contacts, including the dialogues between Vladimir Putin and Recep Erdogan and regular trilateral meetings of the leaders of Russia, Iran, and Türkiye on the sidelines of the Astana peace process on Syria.

Remarkably, the Turkish offline participant of the program (!) journalist Deniz Bustani doubted the future visit to Damascus by the leader of the opposition Republican People's Party of Türkiye Özel Özgür to meet with President Bashar al-Assad (which was announced by the Turkish media, allegedly confirming the consent of the Syrian authorities; I already commented on it).

As an argument, Mr. Bustani referred to the lack of need for dialogues with the Turkish opposition amidst the current direct official contacts between the Syrian leadership and Ankara.

www.tgoop.com/Remarks_of_Orientalist/1577

859 viewsIgor Matveev, Jul 18, 2024 at 10:08

Yesterday, I commented in Arabic with the "After the War" program at the Syrian Television on the prospects for a Syria-Türkiye rapprochement with the diplomatic assistance of Russia. Experts from Syria, Iraq, and Türkiye also took part in the program.

Here are the main points:

- Russia has been making intensive efforts to launch the process of the Syrian-Turkish detente. Among them the facilitation of a four-party meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Iran, Syria, and Türkiye on May 10, 2023, in Moscow. Whereas the road map for a rapprochement was discussed.

- Moscow considers an Ankara-Damascus rapprochement important right now, amidst the multiple conflicts across the MENA region (war in Gaza, clashes in the Red Sea, confrontation between Iran and Israel, etc.). Facing such circumstances, Russia is not interested in further escalations in the region.

- All above mentioned explains why it is not so important for Russia, where a meeting between Presidents al-Assad and Erdogan takes place. The options include Türkiye (which is the most favorable scenario for the Turkish authorities), Iraq, or a GCC state.

- At the same time, Russia understands that a Syrian-Turkish reconciliation cannot be achieved at any cost, i.e without taking into account the legitimate interests of Damascus. Those imply the full restoration of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, as well as the joint struggle of Russia and Syria against terrorism.

This in turn raises the question of restoring a complete control of the Syrian authorities over the part of the Idlib province, now, remaining under the terrorists' control.

One should also not forget that unlike the military personnel of Russia and Iran, the Turkish army (as well as the Americans) occupies certain parts of Syria without the permission of the Syrian government.

- Despite all difficulties, the Russian side considers a normalization of relations between Ankara and Damascus quite possible, focusing on diplomatic methods in achieving this goal. Which could reduce tensions in the areas located along the Syrian-Turkish border.

- The Russian side has been using the established formats of contacts, including the dialogues between Vladimir Putin and Recep Erdogan and regular trilateral meetings of the leaders of Russia, Iran, and Türkiye on the sidelines of the Astana peace process on Syria.

Remarkably, the Turkish offline participant of the program (!) journalist Deniz Bustani doubted the future visit to Damascus by the leader of the opposition Republican People's Party of Türkiye Özel Özgür to meet with President Bashar al-Assad (which was announced by the Turkish media, allegedly confirming the consent of the Syrian authorities; I already commented on it).

As an argument, Mr. Bustani referred to the lack of need for dialogues with the Turkish opposition amidst the current direct official contacts between the Syrian leadership and Ankara.

BY Инсайты Матвеева / Insights from Matveev