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Прокомментировал для российского информагентства News Front ситуацию с провалом очередного раунда переговоров о нормализации ситуации в Газе.
I just commented with the Russian News Front agency the failure of another round of peace talks on Gaza.
Here the main points in English (PART 1).
The war in Gaza, which began during last October highlighted the failure of the US's diplomatic attempts, conducted by the Biden administration to reconcile the Middle East on a mere monetary and economic basis.
Further events have shown that without a fare settlement of the Palestinian problem as such, the Palestinian resistance movement is not interested in gaining economic dividends only. Including those dividends that could result from the global logistics projects, such as the India-Middle East-Europe corridor, requiring a Saudi-Israel rapprochement.
Moreover, the Palestinian resistance movement is not homogeneous. There is Fatah, which has been maintaining working contacts with the West, listening to the Americans (yet, now probably to a lesser extent). And there is Hamas, aligned with Qatar, hosting its political wing, while militarily supported by Iran. Not by chance, the 2000s witnessed the so-called "Palestinian Civil War" reflecting deep contradictions between Fatah and Hamas.
The next point is about what the parties of the conflict and its foreign stakeholders want to gain. Surely, given the current situation, Hamas understands that neither the Americans nor the Israelis want to allow a return of the pre-October 7, 2023 status quo.
At least the political and business circles affiliated with Hamas have been showing readiness to negotiate with Fatah both to maintain own political influence and gain the above mentioned economic "carrots" after the end of the Gaza war. Of course, not under the "classic" Israeli one state formula. Hence, the Hamas's leaders need clear guarantees to be fully incorporated into a future political and economic life of Palestine, recognized by Fatah, the US, and the Israelis themselves.
Hisbollah seemingly serves as an example for Hamas, succeeding to be fully self-engaged in the political and economic life of Lebanon. Thus, Hisbollah has been controlling a number of sectors of the Lebanese economy, as well as enjoying considerable influence in parliament and government. Anyway, Hamas would like to do the same to become an integral part of a future Palestinian society, especially if an eventual process of implementing the "two-state" formula starts.
The next point relates to the stance of the Hamas's military wing, which even after the recent assassination of Ismail Haniyeh by the Israelis in Tehran appears to remain aligned with Iran. Since without attracting the attention of the external actors, Hamas' military wing will inevitably loose its future.
As the Israelis remain tough to eliminate all of Hamas, even the Arabs are interested in politicizing this movement. Following such pattern, Hamas could continue the political strife for a free Palestine but without jeopardizing the ambitious national sustainable development plans, implemented by the same GCC states and Egypt (Saudi "Vision 2030" and others).
BY Инсайты Матвеева / Insights from Matveev
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