Инсайты Матвеева / Insights from Matveev

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Вторая часть моих комментариев для News Front.

My comments with the News Front (PART 2).

The Israeli leadership simply can't turn a blind eye on the anti-Palestinian radicalization of the vast majority of the Israeli society, with the Arab-hostile sentiments prevailing among many ordinary Israelis. Similar sentiments encompass certain parts of the Israeli military and political circles, sometimes becoming even more radical than Prime Minister Netanyahu.

Meanwhile, Benjamin Netanyahu's personal influence seems to be more and more shaky amidst the prospects of criminal prosecution in case of his resignation. Another irritant is posed by the problem of the remaining Israeli hostages, held by Hamas.

The anti-Palestinian sentiments were clearly illustrated by the July Knesset's declaration stating that any Palestinian state would pose an existential threat to Israel. All this highlights the logic of the actions conducted by Israel, not necessarily listening to all pieces of American advice. Netanyahu's recent visit to the US hasn't changed this paradigm.

The Israeli position on both the Gaza war and towards Hamas should be perceived through the broader lenses. Primarily, it is about the escalation of the pol-mil confrontation between Israel and Iran, perceived by the Israeli side as a greater threat to the existence of the Jewish state, as compared to Hamas.

Thus, the situation in and around Gaza is largely subordinative to the logic of the Iran-Israel rivalry. All this in turn hides real risks of a big war in the region, especially in the light of a possible start of the IDF's ground operation in South Lebanon against Hamas-allied Hizbollah.

Another significant point relates to the US. The Americans intend to continue their diplomatic efforts to pacify the Middle East on a monetary basis, preserving consultations with Saudi Arabia. The list of the US's "carrots" for Riyadh includes technological dividends and the expansion of bilateral defense cooperation. Of course, those dividends seem attract the Saudis, who have been aiming to implement the Vision 2030 program, rather than resolve the Palestinian problem.

On the other hand, the new President of Iran Maksud Pezeshkian is considered by the West as a reformist. Such subjective factor could contribute to the revival of the US-Iran closed talks on both the Iranian nuclear dossier and the future of anti-Iranian sanctions. Joe Biden would very much like to go down in history not as the most unsuccessful president, but a person capable of eliminating a serious "Iranian threat."

In contrast to Biden, the Israelis led by Netanyahu consider any US-Iran rapprochement as a challenge for the Jewish state. The Israelis have been doing their best to disrupt this process by pushing the Iranians to take aggressive steps against Israel. In order to make the Americans support Israel in an open military conflict with Iran, thus, burying the opportunities for a reconciliation between Washington and Tehran.

Iran's stance is quite interesting. On the one hand, Tehran wants to preserve the so-called "axis of resilience," consisting of the so-called "Shiite Crescent" (countries with Shiite populations, such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon) and Hamas for the current proxy war with Israel. Yet, Tehran is hardly ready to abandon the doctrine of "strategic patience" in favor of a much more costly open conflict with Israel. On the other hand, right now, the Iranian leadership is paying more attention towards reaching a reconciliation with the US to create favorable conditions for sustainable development through gaining access to advanced technologies with the subsequent lift of sanctions. Which could enhance political stability in Iran via overcoming the harsh economic crisis.

www.tgoop.com/Remarks_of_Orientalist/1630

606 viewsIgor Matveev, edited  Aug 22, 2024 at 11:04

👆👆👆👆👆
Вторая часть моих комментариев для News Front.

My comments with the News Front (PART 2).

The Israeli leadership simply can't turn a blind eye on the anti-Palestinian radicalization of the vast majority of the Israeli society, with the Arab-hostile sentiments prevailing among many ordinary Israelis. Similar sentiments encompass certain parts of the Israeli military and political circles, sometimes becoming even more radical than Prime Minister Netanyahu.

Meanwhile, Benjamin Netanyahu's personal influence seems to be more and more shaky amidst the prospects of criminal prosecution in case of his resignation. Another irritant is posed by the problem of the remaining Israeli hostages, held by Hamas.

The anti-Palestinian sentiments were clearly illustrated by the July Knesset's declaration stating that any Palestinian state would pose an existential threat to Israel. All this highlights the logic of the actions conducted by Israel, not necessarily listening to all pieces of American advice. Netanyahu's recent visit to the US hasn't changed this paradigm.

The Israeli position on both the Gaza war and towards Hamas should be perceived through the broader lenses. Primarily, it is about the escalation of the pol-mil confrontation between Israel and Iran, perceived by the Israeli side as a greater threat to the existence of the Jewish state, as compared to Hamas.

Thus, the situation in and around Gaza is largely subordinative to the logic of the Iran-Israel rivalry. All this in turn hides real risks of a big war in the region, especially in the light of a possible start of the IDF's ground operation in South Lebanon against Hamas-allied Hizbollah.

Another significant point relates to the US. The Americans intend to continue their diplomatic efforts to pacify the Middle East on a monetary basis, preserving consultations with Saudi Arabia. The list of the US's "carrots" for Riyadh includes technological dividends and the expansion of bilateral defense cooperation. Of course, those dividends seem attract the Saudis, who have been aiming to implement the Vision 2030 program, rather than resolve the Palestinian problem.

On the other hand, the new President of Iran Maksud Pezeshkian is considered by the West as a reformist. Such subjective factor could contribute to the revival of the US-Iran closed talks on both the Iranian nuclear dossier and the future of anti-Iranian sanctions. Joe Biden would very much like to go down in history not as the most unsuccessful president, but a person capable of eliminating a serious "Iranian threat."

In contrast to Biden, the Israelis led by Netanyahu consider any US-Iran rapprochement as a challenge for the Jewish state. The Israelis have been doing their best to disrupt this process by pushing the Iranians to take aggressive steps against Israel. In order to make the Americans support Israel in an open military conflict with Iran, thus, burying the opportunities for a reconciliation between Washington and Tehran.

Iran's stance is quite interesting. On the one hand, Tehran wants to preserve the so-called "axis of resilience," consisting of the so-called "Shiite Crescent" (countries with Shiite populations, such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon) and Hamas for the current proxy war with Israel. Yet, Tehran is hardly ready to abandon the doctrine of "strategic patience" in favor of a much more costly open conflict with Israel. On the other hand, right now, the Iranian leadership is paying more attention towards reaching a reconciliation with the US to create favorable conditions for sustainable development through gaining access to advanced technologies with the subsequent lift of sanctions. Which could enhance political stability in Iran via overcoming the harsh economic crisis.

BY Инсайты Матвеева / Insights from Matveev