Приглашаем Вас окунуться в мир загадочного Арабского Востока, окутанного непревзойденным колоритом и шармом, с вековыми обычаями и традициями.

Announcement: An Arab lunch with the presentation "Arab Etiquette: Past, Present, and Future." Scheduled on August 17, at 1PM, in Krasnodar. Restaurant "Kabania."

На встрече вы узнаете:

- откуда пошел арабский этикет

- чем угощают гостей арабские министры и главы компаний

- почему арабы не спешат к богато накрытым столам

- как дарить скромные подарки сказочно богатым шейхам

- почему арабы называют своих жен "домашним МВД"

- как сделать так, чтобы вас хорошо встречали по одежке

- в чем секрет популярности исламских банков.

Спикеры: Игорь Матвеев, дипломат и востоковед с 30-летним стажем работы на Ближнем Востоке.

Анна Волкова - сертифицированный специалист по этикету, автор клуба "Культурный код".

📆Дата: 17 августа

⌚Время:13.00

📌Место:г. Краснодар, ул. Кубанская набережная 39/1, ресторан "Кабанья"

🧆Вас ждет настоящий фестиваль арабской кухни! Более 10 видов разных блюд традиционной и авторской кухни.

Бронирование участия по предоплате 12 000 рублей (to register): @MatveevIgor72

Есть скидки early bird. Количество мест ограничено.

10 августа прокомментировал для популярного ток-шоу "Сасс уполномочен заявить" (с ведущей Надеждой Сасс) на телеканале РТР-Беларусь (запись есть на CTVBY) напряженную обстановку на Ближнем Востоке и возможные сценарии ее развития.

On August 10, I commented with the popular talk show "Sass is Authorized to Declare," presented by Nadezhda Sass at the RTR-Belarus TV channel on the tense situation in the Middle East, as well as its possible developments (a YouTube record is available at the CTVBY).

Хроника комментариев (timing): 29:30-31:32, 33:03-35:47, 43:12-45:27.

Here are the main points in English:

- The situation in the historically conflictogenic Middle East tends to escalate, being characterized by multiple, both regional and extra-regional conflicts with a growing degree of interdependence and mutual influence. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict serves an example, inspiring the current military confrontation between the West and Iran's allied Yemeni Houthis.

- The pol-mil confrontation between Iran and Israel, encompassing the so-called "Shiite Crescent" (Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon) is de-facto a proxy war from the Iranian side. Hence, regretfully, such situation has been hiding real risks of a big war.

- Despite the domestic political orientation of any President of Iran, Tehran's foreign policy priorities remain unchanged. A most important imperative relates to the goal of weakening and lifting the Western, primarily US's sanctions. Which in turn paves a way for Iran's longtime access to advanced technologies, contributing to the strengthening of the country's technological and scientific sovereignty.

- On the contrary, the current Israeli leadership tries to hinder an Iran-West rapprochement, viewed at as a source of new security threats for Israel, resulting from a possible strengthening of the Iranian potential and capacities. Benjamin Netanyahu is especially concerned about the willingness of Joe Biden to conclude a nuclear deal with Tehran in the near future in order to remain in history as a successful US president.

- In the light of the above mentioned, the Israelis continue to take steps hostile to Tehran, pushing Iran to abandon the "strategic patience" and proxy war in favor of an open conflict in which the Americans would join Israel.

- Thus, the foreseeable future doesn't contain prospects for a diplomatic settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Especially, due to the failure of Washington's attempts to "pacify" the Middle East on a monetary and economic basis (i.e. without implementing the "two-state" formula), shown by the war in Gaza.

Продолжая марафон комментариев по поводу событий на Ближнем Востоке, выступил сегодня в программе СоловьевLIFE.

Continuing the marathon of comments on the current events in the Middle East, I just spoke with the SolovievLIFE TV program.

Here are the main points in English.

Answering the question of the program's presenter Armen Gasparyan about the future arrival in Russia of the head of the Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas, I drew attention to the failure of the US's attempt to pacify the Middle East on a monetary and economic basis.

In this regard, given Washington's alliance with Israel, demonstrated by the recent visit to Washington of Benjamin Netanyahu, the Palestinians have been looking for the diplomatic support of other external actors, such as Russia and China.

In turn, while firmly advocating the "two-state" formula of the settlement of the Palestinian problem (as confirmed by Vladimir Putin), Russia has accumulated a vast positive experience in facilitating inter-Palestinian dialogues, aimed at overcoming the existing differences. Thus, last February-March, Moscow hosted a working meeting of several Palestinian factions with the support of Russian orientalists and the MOFA. All those issues could be discussed during Abbas's upcoming visit to Moscow.

Regretfully, there have been more numerous Israeli public calls for harsh actions against Arabs, including the use of nuclear weapons. Such calls raise concerns related to the plans of the Israeli leadership, for instance, to conduct a ground military operation in southern Lebanon. Especially given the problems for Netanyahu himself, who faces possible criminal prosecution in case of his resignation.

Still, despite the Gaza war and Israel's aggressive anti-Iranian actions, Tehran is hardly ready to reconsider "strategic patience," abandoning the proxy war paradigm in favor of a much more costly open conflict with Israel.

The reason is linked to Tehran's focus on reaching an agreement with the US on the Iranian nuclear program, which means easing sanctions and providing the Iranians with the sustainable access to advanced technologies.

For his part, Joe Biden seems ready to make some concessions to remain in history as a successful, not a failed president, at the same time persuading Tehran to take a strictly neutral position towards the Ukrainian crisis.

By the way, the appointment of Abbas Araghchi as a new Iranian Foreign Minister possibly reflects the imperative of the Iranian authorities related to the improvement of relations with the US. Remarkably, this experienced diplomat defended his doctorate thesis at the University of Kent in the UK. He also worked as an ambassador to Finland and Japan, being considered as the main negotiator with the West on Iran's nuclear program.

Сегодняшний день оказался богатым на интересные события.

Авторитетный российский журнал "Государственное управление. Электронный вестник" в своем номере 104 (S) от 12 августа 2024 опубликовал мою статью "О факторах роста интереса арабских стран к евразийскому геополитическому пространству".

Another positive event for today:

A most reputed Russian journal "Public Administration. E-Journal" in its issue #104 (S) dated August 12, 2024 published my article "Drivers of Arab Countries' Growing Interest to the Eurasian Geopolitical Space."

Полный текст статьи доступен в моем Телеграм канале "Просто о непростом Ближнем Востоке". Условия прописки здесь. Для студентов действует постоянная скидка (350 р. вместо 550 р.).

The full text of the article is available in my Telegram channel "Clearly About the Unclear Middle East."

Друзья. О том, как дипломаты, общественные деятели, предприниматели используют улыбку для «камуфляжа», чтобы скрыть волнение, раздражение и неуверенность в ходе переговоров и публичных выступлений, лучше узнавать из уст дипломатов.

Редкий случай, когда моя коллега Нина Шевчук, имеющая большой международный опыт, поделится секретами дипломатической профессии.

Рекомендую подписаться на ее бесплатный вебинар.

It is always better to learn how diplomats, public figures, and entrepreneurs use a smile for "camouflage" to hide overexcitement, irritation, and ambiguity during negotiations and public speeches from diplomats themselves.

Thus, in a rare case, my colleague Nina Shevchuk, who has obtained broad international experience, will share the secrets of the diplomatic profession.

So, I recommend subscribing to her free webinar.

Напоминаю о своем Телеграм-канале "Просто о непростом Ближнем Востоке". Где в последнее время было размещено немало экспертно-аналитических материалов, касающихся Ближнего Востока, и не только.

Студентам 350 рублей вместо 550 (оплата только один раз!).

Записывайтесь: @MatveevIgor72

Dear Friends. I would like to remind you about my Telegram channel "Clearly About the Unclear Middle East." Recently, I posted there a number of new expert materials.

To subscribe: @MatveevIgor72

14 августа казахстанский интернет-ресурс "Чек-Поинт" опубликовал мой комментарий под заголовком "Ближний Восток нуждается в мире - эксперт", касающийся обстановки в регионе, сценариев ее развития и последствий для государств Центральной Азии.

On August 14, the check-point.kz e-resource in Kazakhstan published my comment "Expert: Middle East Needs Peace," dedicated to the current situation in the region, possible developments, and their impact on the Central Asian states.

Here are the main points in English (Part 1):

Contemporary Middle East remains controversial and multifaced.

On the one hand, the region continues suffering from multiple conflicts. Those include the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, pol-mil confrontation between Iran and Israel, along with the conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. All of them are highly internationalized, meaning the involvement of regional and non-regional actors.

Such conflictogenicity contains risks of a big war with global consequences. The Gaza war has already provoked chain reactions, such as the exchanges of strikes between Iran and Israel, the assassination of Hamas leaders by Israel, the latter's struggle against the Lebanese Hizbollah with possible IDF's operation in southern Lebanon, the escalation of the warfare between Tehran-friendly Yemeni Houthis and Western powers, and the diplomatic battles between Israel and Türkiye.

All this reflects the failure of the US's attempts to pacify the Middle East on a monetary-economic basis, just ignoring the imperative of finding a fare solution of the Palestinian problem.

Thus, one could hardly predict future scenarios. Here, much will depend on the behavior of Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders, who by their aggressive steps have been sometimes even ignoring Washington, their major ally and patron. It is also important whether Iran remains committed to the "strategic patience," i.e. the "proxy war" with Israel, using the allied Shiite militias in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. Much will also depend on reaching a nuclear deal between Tehran and Washington.

On the other hand, the Middle East hosts several developing centers of sustainable development. Those encompass the GCC states implementing ambitious national economic programs of the 21st century (Saudi Vision 2030, Kuwait 2035, the 4th Industrial Revolution in the UAE, etc.) and Egypt.

The above-mentioned programs require peace, not to mention the existing plans of building global transport and logistics corridors, such as the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative or the alternative India-Middle East-Europe corridor.

That is why the same Saudis and Qataris, despite the tragedy and humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, continue discussing a rapprochement with Israel under the diplomatic support of the US.

Besides, the MENA region has been facing the detente between regional competitors, for example, Saudi Arabia and Iran (mediated by Beijing), as well as the restoration of Syria's full membership in the Arab League and visible prospects for Ankara-Damascus rapprochement promoted by Moscow.

👆 👆 👆 👆 👆
Вторая часть моего комментария для казахстанского ресурса "Чек-Поинт".

Here is Part 2 of my comments with the Kazakstani check-point.kz e-resource:

The ideologically-fed pol-mil confrontation between Iran and Israel has been in place since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.

Historically, the Israelis have been trying to ensure their national security at the expense of the neighbor Arab states by annexing Palestinian, Jordanian, and Syrian lands by force (incl. most of the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem).

In turn, Iran recognizes the Jewish state as a Zionist entity, called "Big Satan." Hence, the Iranians keep exerting pressure on Israel, using the "axis of resilience," which runs from Iran to the Lebanese-Israeli border via Iraq and Syria, avoiding a much more costly open conflict with Israel.

Despite the escalation in the Middle East, there are real prospects for reaching an agreement between Tehran and Washington on the Iranian nuclear program. It is supported by Joe Biden, trying to remain in history as a successful, not a failed president.

Meanwhile, some of Western experts and policymakers quite rationally believe that the newly-elected Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian, who belongs to the reformist camp could facilitate an Iran-West détente, enjoying the relevant permission from the Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Khamenei. Which eventually enables Tehran to get a longtime access to advanced technologies.

On the contrary, many Israeli politicians and military, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, do fear that a détente between Iran and the US will eventually make Iran stronger economically and militarily, thus, enabling Tehran to launch a large-scale attack on the Jewish state.

Thus, Israel tries to hinder the process of détente between Iran and the US, irritating the Iranians by hostile steps, such as the April 1 strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus or the recent assassination of the Hamas's political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. In other words, the Israelis have been forcing the Iranians to take harsh retaliatory steps, hoping that Washington attacks Iran in solidarity with Israel, burying the US-Iran reconciliation plans.

So far, the Iranians remain committed to the "strategic patience" doctrine, limiting themselves to "ordinary actions of retaliation," mainly through their proxies. Massive (and largely symbolic) April 13-14 use of missiles and drones against Israel was an exception.

However, one should always keep in mind that big wars (like World War I) sometimes begin due to the casus belli, formed by local incidents.

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Третья часть моего комментария для казахстанского ресурса "Чек-Поинт".

Here is Part 3 of my comments with the Kazakstani check-point.kz e-resource:

A big war in the Middle East will have negative consequences for the world, including Central Asia. The implementation of global transport and logistics projects (Belt and Road, India - Middle East - Europe) is already under threat.

Any sharp deterioration of the pol-mil situation in the Middle East provokes a rapid increase in defense spending of the GCC states, limiting their foreign investment potentials.

This applies to Central Asia, which has been facing the growing investment interest of Qatar. It was demonstrated during both the visit of the Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani to Central Asia (including Kazakhstan) in June 2023 and the reciprocal (first in history) state visit to Doha, paid by President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on February 13-14, 2024.

A sharp escalation of tensions in the Middle East could eliminate those plans.

Голосование в рамках викторины "Исследуя Евразию и Ближний Восток" проходит в моем чате по ссылке: https://www.tgoop.com/c/1703843987/1511

The voting within the framework of the quiz "Exploring Eurasia and the Middle East" takes place in my chat. The link is: https://www.tgoop.com/c/1703843987/1511

#конкурсы quizzes

Прокомментировал для российского информагентства News Front ситуацию с провалом очередного раунда переговоров о нормализации ситуации в Газе.

I just commented with the Russian News Front agency the failure of another round of peace talks on Gaza.

Here the main points in English (PART 1).

The war in Gaza, which began during last October highlighted the failure of the US's diplomatic attempts, conducted by the Biden administration to reconcile the Middle East on a mere monetary and economic basis.

Further events have shown that without a fare settlement of the Palestinian problem as such, the Palestinian resistance movement is not interested in gaining economic dividends only. Including those dividends that could result from the global logistics projects, such as the India-Middle East-Europe corridor, requiring a Saudi-Israel rapprochement.

Moreover, the Palestinian resistance movement is not homogeneous. There is Fatah, which has been maintaining working contacts with the West, listening to the Americans (yet, now probably to a lesser extent). And there is Hamas, aligned with Qatar, hosting its political wing, while militarily supported by Iran. Not by chance, the 2000s witnessed the so-called "Palestinian Civil War" reflecting deep contradictions between Fatah and Hamas.

The next point is about what the parties of the conflict and its foreign stakeholders want to gain. Surely, given the current situation, Hamas understands that neither the Americans nor the Israelis want to allow a return of the pre-October 7, 2023 status quo.

At least the political and business circles affiliated with Hamas have been showing readiness to negotiate with Fatah both to maintain own political influence and gain the above mentioned economic "carrots" after the end of the Gaza war. Of course, not under the "classic" Israeli one state formula. Hence, the Hamas's leaders need clear guarantees to be fully incorporated into a future political and economic life of Palestine, recognized by Fatah, the US, and the Israelis themselves.

Hisbollah seemingly serves as an example for Hamas, succeeding to be fully self-engaged in the political and economic life of Lebanon. Thus, Hisbollah has been controlling a number of sectors of the Lebanese economy, as well as enjoying considerable influence in parliament and government. Anyway, Hamas would like to do the same to become an integral part of a future Palestinian society, especially if an eventual process of implementing the "two-state" formula starts.

The next point relates to the stance of the Hamas's military wing, which even after the recent assassination of Ismail Haniyeh by the Israelis in Tehran appears to remain aligned with Iran. Since without attracting the attention of the external actors, Hamas' military wing will inevitably loose its future.

As the Israelis remain tough to eliminate all of Hamas, even the Arabs are interested in politicizing this movement. Following such pattern, Hamas could continue the political strife for a free Palestine but without jeopardizing the ambitious national sustainable development plans, implemented by the same GCC states and Egypt (Saudi "Vision 2030" and others).

👆👆👆👆👆
Вторая часть моих комментариев для News Front.

My comments with the News Front (PART 2).

The Israeli leadership simply can't turn a blind eye on the anti-Palestinian radicalization of the vast majority of the Israeli society, with the Arab-hostile sentiments prevailing among many ordinary Israelis. Similar sentiments encompass certain parts of the Israeli military and political circles, sometimes becoming even more radical than Prime Minister Netanyahu.

Meanwhile, Benjamin Netanyahu's personal influence seems to be more and more shaky amidst the prospects of criminal prosecution in case of his resignation. Another irritant is posed by the problem of the remaining Israeli hostages, held by Hamas.

The anti-Palestinian sentiments were clearly illustrated by the July Knesset's declaration stating that any Palestinian state would pose an existential threat to Israel. All this highlights the logic of the actions conducted by Israel, not necessarily listening to all pieces of American advice. Netanyahu's recent visit to the US hasn't changed this paradigm.

The Israeli position on both the Gaza war and towards Hamas should be perceived through the broader lenses. Primarily, it is about the escalation of the pol-mil confrontation between Israel and Iran, perceived by the Israeli side as a greater threat to the existence of the Jewish state, as compared to Hamas.

Thus, the situation in and around Gaza is largely subordinative to the logic of the Iran-Israel rivalry. All this in turn hides real risks of a big war in the region, especially in the light of a possible start of the IDF's ground operation in South Lebanon against Hamas-allied Hizbollah.

Another significant point relates to the US. The Americans intend to continue their diplomatic efforts to pacify the Middle East on a monetary basis, preserving consultations with Saudi Arabia. The list of the US's "carrots" for Riyadh includes technological dividends and the expansion of bilateral defense cooperation. Of course, those dividends seem attract the Saudis, who have been aiming to implement the Vision 2030 program, rather than resolve the Palestinian problem.

On the other hand, the new President of Iran Maksud Pezeshkian is considered by the West as a reformist. Such subjective factor could contribute to the revival of the US-Iran closed talks on both the Iranian nuclear dossier and the future of anti-Iranian sanctions. Joe Biden would very much like to go down in history not as the most unsuccessful president, but a person capable of eliminating a serious "Iranian threat."

In contrast to Biden, the Israelis led by Netanyahu consider any US-Iran rapprochement as a challenge for the Jewish state. The Israelis have been doing their best to disrupt this process by pushing the Iranians to take aggressive steps against Israel. In order to make the Americans support Israel in an open military conflict with Iran, thus, burying the opportunities for a reconciliation between Washington and Tehran.

Iran's stance is quite interesting. On the one hand, Tehran wants to preserve the so-called "axis of resilience," consisting of the so-called "Shiite Crescent" (countries with Shiite populations, such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon) and Hamas for the current proxy war with Israel. Yet, Tehran is hardly ready to abandon the doctrine of "strategic patience" in favor of a much more costly open conflict with Israel. On the other hand, right now, the Iranian leadership is paying more attention towards reaching a reconciliation with the US to create favorable conditions for sustainable development through gaining access to advanced technologies with the subsequent lift of sanctions. Which could enhance political stability in Iran via overcoming the harsh economic crisis.

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Третья часть моих комментариев для News Front.

My comments with the News Front (PART 3).

In sum, any future Iranian support for Hamas will largely depend on an Iran-US detente.

If both sides finally agree, the Iranians will severely limit not to say even stop helping Hamas's military wing, focusing instead together with the Arabs on providing Hamas with diplomatic support to ensure the fare two-state solution to the Palestinian problem.

The final point is Russia's position, clearly outlined by President Vladimir Putin, recognizing the two-state formula as the only fare solution, meaning the creation of a full-fledged independent Palestinian state. I think, this aspect was discussed with the leader of the PNA and Fatah Mahmoud Abbas who recently visited Moscow.

Russia continues diplomatic efforts assisting the Palestinians to find common interests in solving the Palestinian issue. Those steps correlate with the similar Chinese efforts, based on Beijing's previous success in facilitating the process of detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

This constitutes a fundamental difference between the stance of our country and those of the US and Israel, who have been always promoting the one-state formula. Especially now, whereas on the eve of the November presidential elections, Washington simply can't exert any "harsh" pressure on Israel, experiencing the traditional influence of the Jewish lobby on the political affairs inside the US.

Вчера Российский совет по международным делам опубликовал мою статью "Сирия — Турция: нормализация vs конфронтация", которая посвящена перспективам примирения Анкары и Дамаска при дипломатическом содействии Москвы.

Yesterday, the Russian International Affairs Council published my article "Syria - Türkiye: Normalization vs. Confrontation." It highlights the perspectives of rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus under Moscow's diplomatic mediation.

С текстом статьи можно ознакомиться на сайте и в Телеграм канале РСМД. The text is available in Russian at both the RIAC's website and Telegram channel.

Here is the brief in English.

Recently, there have been numerous public statements by the leaders of Syria and Türkiye about their readiness to restore the relations between both countries.

Regretfully, those statements coincided with the sharp rise of anti-Syrian sentiments in Türkiye, encompassing the areas adjacent to the Syrian-Turkish border, and not only. It was provoked by an incident which happened on June 30, in the city of Kayseri in Türkiye, whereas a Syrian migrant was arrested on charges of raping a child.

Nevertheless, the Turkish leadership and personally President Erdogan have been advocating the rapprochement, admitting the existence of common interests in deterring the Syrian Kurds, together with the need to pacify so-called "Small Idlib" in Syria, still controlled by the terrorists from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (banned in Russia).

Both Turkish and Syrian business communities are interested in restoring bilateral trade and economic ties. Here, the Turks bear in mind future competitions with the Arab rivalries (Saudi Arabia, the UAE) in the future rebuilding of Syria.

Official Damascus is also ready for the rapprochement, remembering the 2000s positive experience of developing bilateral economic cooperation. In pol-mil terms, the Syrian leadership is interested in the full return of Idlib, avoiding a costly military scenario.

Besides, the Syrian authorities could be interested in weakening the Kurdish self-proclaimed "Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria" by the use of a tactical alliance with Ankara.

Those stances seem to be spoiled by the "Kayseri incident" and the subsequent escalation, allegedly supported by the Turkish proxies in northern Syria, as well as the radicals in "Small Idlib," threatened by the perspective of the return of those territories under Damascus's control.

Yet, the perspectives for Syria-Türkiye rapprochement still exist.

Голосование в рамках викторины "Исследуя Евразию и Ближний Восток" проходит в моем чате по ссылке: https://www.tgoop.com/c/1703843987/1532

The voting within the framework of the quiz "Exploring Eurasia and the Middle East" takes place in my chat. The link is: https://www.tgoop.com/c/1703843987/1532

#конкурсы quizzes